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Many developing countries and transitional  economies have a mandate  to de-
centralize  some aspects  of their  public finance.  In addition,  many developed
economies such as the United  States,  the  United Kingdom,  and  Canada  are
reviving their  policy debates  on devolution.  Decentralization  of expenditure
and  revenue decisions of the  central government  is seen as part  of a package
to improve the efficiency of the public sector, cut the budget deficit, and pro-
mote economic growth (Bird and Wallich, 1993; Bahl and Linn, 1992; Rivlin,
1992; Gramlich,  1993; Oates,  1993; and  Bird,  1993).  The argument  is that
decentralization  will increase economic efficiency since local governments  are
better  positioned  to deliver public services that  match  local preferences and
needs  than  the  national  government  (Oates,  1972).  Over  time,  efficiency
gains  will lead to fast  local as well as national  economic growth.
This  wisdom is shared  by numerous  studies  on intergovernmental  fiscal
relations  in China  (Bahl and Wallich, 1992; World Bank,  1990, 1992, 1995).
Many  proposals  favor assigning  more revenue and  expenditure  responsibil-
ities  to  localities  from  the  center.  However, a  concern  has  emerged  that
decentralization  in  China  has been  implemented  too  fast  and  has gone  too
far,  and  that  this  is threatening  macroeconomic  control and  stability.  Fur-
thermore,  in  this  process,  national  priorities  in  public  spending  have often
been crowded out  by local public projects.
Despite  the  foregoing policy concerns,  there  has  been no  empirical  at-
3tempt  to  explore  the  relationship  between  fiscal decentralization  and  eco-
nomic growth in developing countries  in general and  China in particular.  In
this  paper,  we use the  Chinese case tS demonstrate  how the  allocation  of
fiscal revenues and  expenditures  between  the central  government  and  local
governments  has  affected economic growth  since reforms of the late  1970s.
The outline  of this paper is as follows. A theoretical  model of fiscal decen-
tralization  and  growth is laid out  in the next section.  Section 3 summarizes
the  trends  in  fiscal allocations  between  the  center  and  provincial  govern-
ments.  Section 4 contains  the empirical  application  of the theoretical  model
to the  Chinese economy. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2  A  Growth  Model  with  Different  Levels  of
Government  Spending
Following Barro  (1990)1, we begin with an endogenous growth model consist-
ing of a production  function  with  two inputs:  production  capital  and  public
spending  where the function exhibits  constant  returns  to  scale in the two in-
puts.  We depart  from the Barro  model by assuming  that  public spending  is
carried  out by two levels of government:  central and provincial governments.
Let  k be the  capital  stock,  g the  total  government  spending,  f  central  gov-
ernment  spending  and  s local government  spending:
f  +s=g  (1)
'Some  related  models  are  presented  in  Devarajan,  Swaroop  and  Zou  (1993),  and
Davoodi,  Xie, and  Zou (1995).
4The production  function  is CES:
y =  [ak4 + OfI  + 7ysl] /l,)  -oo  <  < 1  (2)
where a,  ,B, and -y are all in  (0,1)  and  a + /3  +  y =  1. The CES production
functions  include the  Cobb-Douglas  specification  as a special  case (o =  0).
The introduction  of public spending  by different levels of government  creates
a  potential  link between  fiscal decentralization  (i.e.  differential  effects  of
spending  by the two levels of government)  and  growth.  As in  Barro  (1990),
when specifying the production  function we abstract  from human capital  and
labor,  but  we allow for these additional  inputs  in the empirical  work.
The  consolidated  government spending  g is financed  by a flat output  tax
at  rate  T:
g = 'ry  (3)
To derive the long-run  growth rate  of the  economy, we first  analyze the
decisions made  by the  production-consumption  sector.  We consider a long-
lived producer-consumer  unit  which maximizes its  discounted  utility,
max  i  [C  l]  e-P tdt  (4)
where c is the consumption  of a single good produced  in this  economy; a  is
the  inverse of the  intertemporal  elasticity  of substitution;  and  p is the  rate
of time preference.
The dynamic  budget  constraint  for the producer-consumer  unit is:
=  (1-  r) [aek' +±f  0 + as+]  - c,  ko given.  (5)
5The  producer-consumer  unit  takes  as given the government's  announce-
ment  of the  fixed tax  rate  r,the  spending  at different levels of governments,
f  and  s. It  then  chooses optimally  the consumption  path  {c(t):  t  > 0} and
the  path  of the  capital  stock  {k(t):  t  > O}.  To  characterize  the producer-
consumer unit's  optimal  allocation  of resources, we write down the  Hamilto-
nian:
H  1a  _  Iy  +  A {(I  -T)  [akO + #f  +  s]/c}  (6)
The first  order  conditions  are given by,
A  x(7)
A  = pA - Aa(l - r)  [akO  + Of  f  +  ysO]  I1  k)/4  "  (8)
The transversality  condition  is kAe-Pt --  0 as t approaches  infinity.
Equations  (5), (7), (8) with the initial transversality  conditions determine
the producer-consumer  unit's  optimal responses.  One immediate  result from
these equations  is that  the growth rate  of consumption  is given by,
c=  r(x)-  p(9
c  al
where x denotes the vector (k, f,  s, r);  r(x)  has the interpretation  of the real
interest  rate  and  is defined by
r(x)  = a(1  - r)  [akO  + Of  + tys  kO-.  (10)
Let us define the  spending  shares for the  central  and  local governments
as Vof  and  W., respectively:
(tOf  =  Ws,fa  = 9  (11)
g  g
6Then, we can solve the long-run  growth rate,  G, of the economy explicitly as
spending  shares,  income tax, and  other  exogenous factors:
G  T)  -T  1P  (12)
Thus,  the allocation  of public spending  among different levels of govern-
ment  can affect the rate  of economic growth as seen from equation  (12).  To
examine  how the long-run  growth  rate  responds  to  various spending  shares
and  income taxation,  we assume that  the government's  objective  is to  max-
imize the  growth  rate  in  (12) by choosing  r,  pf  and  s.  This  is the  same
as maximizing  the producer-consumer  unit's  consumption  growth  (which co-
incides with  the  rate  of growth of output  and  capital)  in  (9) subject  to the




subject  to:  f  + S < r [akX  + /3f  +  ±ys'l  0]  (14)
The growth-maximizing  tax rate  is given in the following equation:
=  +  ')  (15)
where II =  31/(10-)  ± 5,l/('-).
The growth-maximizing  shares of the central and local government spend-
ing are given by,
OV-  (16)
71/(1-0)
5°s=  II  (17)
7From the  results  above, we can obtain  the real interest  rate  r(x)  as follows:
r(x)  =  (1 - -)(y/k)'-  =  C(1 - r) {IIX  - vI}  (18)
where  T  is the  solution  from equation  (22).  The  maximum  rate  of growth
of consumption  can  then  be  calculated  using  equation  (9).  Here  we can
interpret  31/(0-)  and 7l/(l-)  as the measures of the individual productivity
of spending  by the central  and  local government,  respectively.  In the  same
light, rI =  1/(l-0)  +±  l/(0-)  represents the aggregate productivity of both
levels of government  spending  . From  equations  (16) and  (17),  it  is  not
difficult to  see that  the growth-maximizing  spending  shares are equal to  the
ratios  of individual  productivity  to  the aggregate productivity.  If the actual
spending  shares do not correspond  to these growth-maximizing  shares, some
reallocation  of resources among the two levels of government will be growth-
enhancing.
This  point  can be  made  most  clearly  in  the  case of the  Cobb-Douglas
production  function.  With  the Cobb-Douglas  technology, q  =  0.  Then,  the
growth-maximizing  tax  rate  given by equation  (22) is very simple:
-7*  =0  +±Y,  (19)
which is the  same as the  formula in Barro  (1990) after  the notation  is made
consistent.  II is simply equal to  (oB  +  y). Thus the growth-maximizing  shares
of the central  and  local government  speeding  are also very simple:
*=  +  (20)
- (21)
8To test  the impact  on economic growth of spending by different levels of
government,  we use provincial panel data  on China  over the period  of 1978
to  1992.  But  before our formal  statistical  analysis,  we take  a brief look at
the data  to see the patterns  of revenue and expenditure  allocations  between
the center  and provinces and among provinces in China.
3  Trends  of Intergovernmental  Fiscal  Alloca-
tions  in  China:  1978-1992
Since the late  1970s, several rounds of fiscal reform have been conducted  in
China  in an  effort to  decentralize  the  fiscal system  and  fiscal management
(World Bank  1990; Wong et al 1993; Zhou and Yang 1992). Can we say that
the  resulting  Chinese fiscal system  is decentralized?  The following exami-
nation  of the  Chinese  central-local  fiscal status  suggests  that  the  question
should be answered  very carefully. 2
3.1  Trend  in  overall  fiscal  status
Following the public finance literature,  we measure the overall fiscal status  in
China as the spending-to-GDP  ratio of all governments, including the central
and  local governments.3 Government  spending  is measured  in  three  differ-
ent ways:  budgetary  spending,  extra-budgetary  spending,  and  consolidated
2Local governments  include  all sub-national  governments  in this  paper.
3The data  used  in our  calculation  is described  in detail  in the  Data  Appendix.
9spending,  which is the sum of budgetary  and extra-budgetary  spending.  The
time  trends  of government  spending  are shown in Figure  1.
The  spending-to-GDP  ratio  in  budgetary  finance  was  18.27 percent  in
1992 compared  to 30.77 percent  in  1978.  Although  there  were insignificant
rises  from  1978 to  1979, from  1985 to  1986, and  from  1988 to  1989, the
budgetary  spending-to-GDP  ratio  declined continuously  since the  beginning
of the reform in 1978. On the extra-budget  side, changes in spending-to-GDP
ratio  were  merely  arithmetic,  although  the  ratio  rose  from  14.17 percent
in  1982 to  15.20 percent  in  1992.4  The  consolidated  budget  exhibited  an
inverted  U-shape with  the measure of spending-to-GDP  ratio  first up during
1982-1986 and  then  down during  1986-1992, from 36.43 percent  in  1982 to
40.35 percent  in 1986, and  to 33.47 percent  in  1992.
The above results  show that  the overall fiscal status  of consolidated  gov-
ernment  weakened during the reform period, especially for budgetary  finance.
This  trend  can also be confirmed by the measure of revenue-to-GDP  ratio  of
consolidated  government  revenue, as shown in Figure  2.
3.2  Relative  status  of  the  central-local  budget
Fiscal  decentralization  is mainly  measured  by the  relative  size of the  local
budget  with  respect  to  the  central  budget.  Despite  China's  unitary  sys-
tem,  in which  tax  laws and  tax  policies  are set  by the  central  government
and  applied  uniformly nationwide,  there  are no delineations  of powers and
4The central  and  provincial-aggregated  data of extra-budgetary  spending  became avail-
able  in 1982.
10responsibilities  between  the  central  and  local governments  in practice.  In
many respects,  as pointed  out in  a World Bank study,  "the  Chinese system
functions  as a federalism"  (World Bank  1990).  Therefore,  both  central  and
local  governments  have contributed  significantly  to  the  allocation  and  uti-
lization  of public  resources.  On the  spending  side, the  central  government
had  a of 46.89 percent  share of the total  government  budgetary  spending  in
1978. This  share  became 42.60 percent  in 1992, indicating  small progress in
budgetary  decentralization.  But a closer examination  reveals that  the central
spending  share first  kept rising until  1981 when it reached  at 54.01 percent,
then  went down as far as 36.35 percent  in  1989, and  subsequently  rose again
to  almost  return  to its  original  level.  Although  the total  spending  share  of
the  central  government  rose and  fell, the  central  budgetary  spending  share
declined over most  of the past  decade, as shown in Figure  3.
3.3  Central-local  enterprise  relations
Turning  to  extra-budgetary  revenue  and  spending,  we see quite  a different
picture.  In China, government budgets  include not only budgetary  funds but
also extra-budgetary  funds (EBF),  about  80 percent  of which come from the
income and profits generated by state-owned enterprises  (SOEs) (World Bank
1990).5  Given the nature  of EBF,  fiscal decentralization  can be achieved if
5Extra-budgetary  funds are created  to supplement  budgetary  resources among  govern-
ments,  public  agencies, and  SOEs.  They are usually managed  and  allocated  with a certain
amount  of revenue assigned  by the  central  government.  Local governments  can also create
such  assignments  to their  "owned" SOEs  under  the  delegation  of the  central  government.
For details,  see World Bank  (1990), Shirk  (1993), and  Wong et al  (1993).
11the central  government  shifts public resources to local governments  through
assigning more SOEs to local governments.  To measure fiscal decentralization
this  way, we use the central  shares of extra-budgetary  revenue (EBR)  and of
extra-budgetary  spending  (EBS). That  is, a higher degree of decentralization
is indicated  by a smaller  central share  of the EBR  (and/or  EBS).
As  shown  in  Figure  3 and  Figure  4  respectively,  the  central  shares  in
EBR and  EBS showed similar movements over time.  The central EBR  share
rose from 33.72 percent  in 1982 to 41.57 percent  in 1985, and  again to  44.30
percent  in  1992.  The central  EBS share  also increased:  from  30.91 percent
in 1982 to 40.87 percent  in 1985, and again, to 43.64 percent  in 1992. Unlike
central  budgetary  spending,  figures in  central  EBR  and  EBS manifested  a
trend  of fiscal decentralization  over the post-reform  period.
3.4  Fiscal  decentralization  in  provincial  perspective
We now further  explore  fiscal decentralization  by looking into  government
spending  in twenty-eight  provinces.6 In addition  to the complications  in the
central-local  (aggregate) fiscal relations described earlier, more variations  can
be found in fiscal decentralization  on the  basis of provincial comparisons.
First,  there is significant cross-province heterogeneity  in the degree of fis-
cal decentralization.  The ratio of budgetary  spending to provincial income on
average (1980-1992) ranged from 8.96 percent in Jiangsu (a coastal province)
60f  the  total  thirty  provincial  areas  in China  (mainland),  two  provincial  areas,  Tibet
and  Hainan,  are  excluded  due  to their  special  status.  For a complete  list  of the  twenty-
eight  provincial  areas  used  in this  study,  see the  Data  Appendix.
12to  40.52 percent  in  Ningxia (an inland  minority  province),  indicating  a gen-
eral tendency  for provincial  government  to  participate  less in developed  ar-
eas than  in less developed areas.  Further  complications  came from the  three
metropolitan  cities,  Beijing,  Tianjin,  and  Shanghai, which held the  highest
ranks in per-capita  income and above average levels of the ratio of budgetary
spending  to  provincial  income.  Table  1 shows the  provincial  variations  in
provincial  per-capita  income and  the size of provincial budget  in the period
1980-1992.
In  measures  of fiscal decentralization,  cross-province disparities  are  also
evident.  As shown in Table  2(a),  2(b), and  2(c), on average in the period  of
1978-1992, the  ratio  of provincial budgetary  spending  to  central  budgetary
spending  ranged from 1.08 percent  in Ningxia to 8.91 percent  in  Guangdong
(a  leading  province  in  economic reform).  For extra-budgetary  funds,  the
ratio  of provincial  consolidated  budgetary  spending  to  central  consolidated
budgetary  spending  varied from 0.91 percent  in Ningxia to  10.28 percent  in
Liaoning,  one  of China's  heavy  industrial  centers.  Measured  by  the  ratio
of per-capita  provincial budgetary  spending  to  per capita  central budgetary
spending,  fiscal decentralization  was as low as 70.57 percent  in  Guizhou (a
mountainous  minority province) and as high as 436.18 percent  in Beijing (the
nation's  capital).
Second,  the intertemporal  picture  in fiscal decentralization  is also diver-
sified among  provinces.  Guangdong, a  coastal  province favored  by central
government  policies and  among the  first to  start  economic reforms in  1978,
experienced  the greatest  increase in fiscal decentralization.  Measured  by the
ratio  of provincial budgetary  spending  to central  budgetary  spending,  there
13was  a  112.97 percent  increase  in  Guangdong from  1978 to  1992.7  At  the
other  extreme,  Qinghai, one  of the  eight  minority  provincial  areas,  hardly
saw any changes in fiscal decentralization,  with its provincial-to-central  bud-
getary ratio  narrowing from 1.31 percent  in 1978 to 1.20 percent in 1991, and
to  0.99 percent  in  1992. Between  Guangdong and  Qinghai stand  mostly  in-
land provincial areas. Sichuan, the most populous province in China, started
with  its  provincial-to-central  spending  share  at 6.86 percent  in  1978 (higher
than  Guangdong's 5.51 percent  in  1978) and  ended with  only  8.54 percent
in 1992 (lower than  Guangdong's 11.73 percent  in 1992). Henan, a long-time
center  of ancient  China,  also saw changes in a much narrowed  range,  from
6.47 percent  in 1978 down to  5.56 percent  in 1992 in its provincial-to-central
budgetary  spending  ratio.  Comparisons  of fiscal decentralization  in  these
four provinces are presented  in Figure  5.
3.5  Summary
The  above discussion  suggests that  fiscal reform in  China  does not  yield  a
clear  pattern  of decentralization.  (1) Budgetary  spending  became more de-
centralized  since 1978.  (2) Extra-budgetary  spending,  however, showed an
increasing  central  share  through  the  entire  reform period.  (3) The  consol-
idated  (budgetary  and  extra-budgetary)  central  spending  share  fluctuated,
starting  with  42.09 percent  in 1982, 43.44 percent  in 1985, 37.54 percent  in
1987, and  ending  at  43.09 percent  in  1992.  (4) On the  revenue  side, man-
7Due  to data availablity,  intertemporal comparisons  of provincial  fiscal  decentralization
employ only the ratio of provincial budgetary spending to central budgetary spending.
14agement and collection became even morje centralized.  Combining budgetary
and  extra-budgetary  funds,  the  central  revenue share  increased  from  27.57
percent  in  1982 to  41.92 percent  in  1992, indicating  a strengthened  central
control in governmental  revenue.  (5) Fiscal decentralization  was found to be
highly divergent  across provinces and over time.  In the following section, we
will quantify  the  impact  of various decentralization  measures  on provincial
economic growth.
4  Empirical  Estimations  with  Provincial-Level
Data
4.1  Variables  and  estimation  equation
Our empirical estimations  are based on the annual  data  over the period from
1980 to  1992 for  28 provinces.  The  dependent  variable  is  the  provincial
income growth  rate  in real terms.8 The explanatory  variables  fall into three
categories:  (1)production  inputs;  (2) measures of fiscal decentralization;  and
(3) others,  such as tax rates,  foreign trade,  and inflation rates.
We use the following data  in our estimations:
Y =  real growth  rate  of provincial  income, measured  in  the percentage
change;
L = growth rate of the provincial labor force, measured by the percentage
change in the total  number of the labor force;
8Provincial  income  is defined  as  provincial  equivalenct  of  national  income  (Guomin
Shouru),  which  measures  net  provincial  output  according  Chinese  statistics.
1
15I =  provincial investment  rate,  measured  by the ratio  of investment  (ac-
cumulation  in fixed asset and  circulating  funds)  to provincial income;
F = degree of openness of provincial economy, measured  by the  share of
total  volume of foreign trade  (exports  and imports)  in provincial income;
T  =  degree of distortion  in provincial economy, measured  by the  ratio  of
provincial revenue collection to provincial income;
R  =  inflation  rate,  measured  by the  overall social  retail  price  index  in
each province;
DC  =  degree  of fiscal decentralization,  measured  by  the  following six
different indicators:
DCc.e. =  the ratio of total  provincial spending  to total  central spending;
DCcse2  = the ratio of per-capita  provincial spending to per-capita  central
spending;g
DCbel =  the ratio  of provincial budgetary  spending  to central budgetary
spending;
DCbe 2 =  the  ratio  of per-capita  provincial  budgetary  spending  to  per-
capita  central  budgetary  spending;
DC~eib=  the ratio of provincial extra-budgetary  spending to central extra-
budgetary  spending;
DCebe2  = the ratio  of [provincial extra-budgetary  spending/provincial  in-
come] to  [central extra-budgetary  spending/national  income];
9The central  per capita  spending  is the central  spending  divided by the total  population
of China.
16To these  provincial-level  data  we fit  our  growth  model  as  follows:
28
YDt = 13m  Mt  +  3nN 8st  +  /3dODC 8t ±  oSzD 8 + u8t  (22)
s=1
where  s and  t indicate  province  and  year,  respectively,  Mst  is a set of variables
always  included  in  the  regression,  DCst  denotes  variables  of interest,  Nt  is
a  subset  of  variables  identified  by  the  literature  as  potentially  important
explanatory  variables  of growth,  Ds denotes  provincial  dummy  variable,  and
finally,  ust  denotes  error  term.  Numbers  of variables  included  in  the  M- and
N-sets  are  denoted  by  m  and  n  respectively.
The  M-variables  consist  of the  growth  rate  in the  total  labor  force  (L) and
the  tax  rate  (T).  The  labor  growth  rate  is not  explicitly  considered  in  our
theoretical  model  for analytical  simplicity.  The  tax  variable  is our  aggregate
measure  of distortion  introduced  by  governments  to  finance  their  spending.
Other  variables  identified  as  potentially  important  explanatory  variables  of
growth  in many  studies  on  economic  growth  are  included  as the  N-variables.
They  are  degree  of openness  (F),  the  inflation  rate  (R),  and  finally,  the  in-
vestment  rate  (I).  The  usual  argument  for including  the  degree  of openness
as  a  determinant  of growth  states  that  more  exports  lead  to  more  efficient
resource  allocation  as  a  result  of external  competition  in  the  world  market
and  more  imports  are  the  means  to  import  advanced  technology  from  devel-
oped  economies  (see,  Feder  1983).  Inflation  can  generate  a positive  effect  on
growth  because  higher  inflation  leads  people  to  invest  more  in  physical  capi-
tal  and  cut  their  real-balance  holdings  (the  Tobin  portfolio  shift  effect),  but
at  the  same  time,  inflation  raises  the  transaction  cost  of economic  activities
(consumption  and  investment)  and  may  reduce  the  rate  of economic  growth.
17The  investment  rate  appears  as  a  "must-include"  variable  in  conventional
specifications of growth estimation.  But  in our analysis, it is endogenous.  In
order to make sure that  our results are robust across different specifications of
regression equations,  we also include the investment rate  as one explanatory
variable  in our sensitivity  analysis.  From our theoretical  model  in equation
(12), our  central  concern  is the  third  set  of variables  DC 8 t in  (22):  the  six
different indicators  of fiscal decentralization.
4.2  Regression  results
4.2.1  Base  case
As our base case, we first choose the M-variables and one of the six indicators
of fiscal decentralization,  DCbe2,  the  ratio  of per-capita  provincial  spending
to  per-capita  central  spending,  while ignoring the potentially  important  N-
variables.  The  LSDV  (Least  Squares  Dummy  Variables)  regression  results
over the  1986-1992 period  are:
Yst =  0.274L,t  -0.407Tt  -0.05DCbe 2 .,
(0.878)  (-2.628)  (-3.541)
(Adjusted  R2 = 0.328, number of observation  =  196; values of t-statistics
appear  in  parentheses).  The  M-variables  have signs  as  predicted  by  our
model  but  are not  significantly  different from zero at  the  5 percent  signifi-
cance level. Our primary  concern is the sign and magnitude  of the coefficient
for decentralization,  which  is -0.05 and  is significantly  different  from  zero
at  the  5 percent  significance level.  The  regression result  implies that  fiscal
18decentralization  in China did not promote  provincial economic growth,  indi-
cating  an inappropriate  level of decentralization  or too much decentralization
in government  budgetary  spending.
To see whether  this  conclusion is robust  to  changes in  the  conditioning
information  set, we conducted  sensitivity  tests  against  the base equation.
Table 3 presents  the sensitivity  results for each of the M-variables and the
indicators  of fiscal decentralization.  Eight estimations  are conducted  along
with  different  selections of the three  N-variables.  The labor  coefficients are
positive  but  not  significantly different from zero at  the 5 percent  confidence
level, and  the non-significance result  is consistent  between  the lower bound
and  the  upper  bound  of the  labor  coefficient.  Similar  results  are observed
with  the  coefficients of the  tax  rates.  Our major  variable  of interest  is fis-
cal decentralization,  DCbe2.  The  decentralization  coefficient is negative  and
robust.' 0 At  the  upper  bound,  the decentralization  coefficient is -0.047 with
the t-statistic  of -3.67, while it becomes -0.069 with the t-statistic  of -4.821 at
the lower bound.  This result implies that  economic growth falls by as little  as
4.7 percent  and  by as much as 6.9 percent  for each additional  unit  of decen-
tralization  measured  by  DCbe2 the  ratio  of per-capita  provincial budgetary
spending  to per-capita  central  budgetary  spending.
4.2.2  Structural  changes
To further  investigate  our result of a negative effect of fiscal decentralization
on Chinese provincial economic growth,  structural  changes are introduced  in
lFollowing  Levine and Renelt (1992), we say the result is robust if the regression co-
effiecient  remains significant and of the same sign at the extreme (lower  and upper) bounds.
19the  following two ways with  respect  to  the  base case:  (1)  different  sample
periods,  (2) different selections of decentralization  indicators,  and  (3) cross-
province estimations  based  on provincial average values in the period  1986-
1992.
Table 4 contains results  of structure  changes introduced  in the base case.
First,  the  negative  correlation  between  fiscal decentralization  and  growth
maintains  for all the three  sample periods:  1986-1992, 1980-1992, and  1985-
1989.  The  first sample  period  is our base  sample period  for which  we have
consistent  data  from the  State  Bureau  of Statistics  (SBS).  The  second one
extends  the  base  sample  period  to  the  beginning  of reforms  and  contains
data  from provincial bureaus  of statistics  in addition  to those from SBS. The
third  sample  is selected to  specify the  period  during  which extensive  fiscal
decentralization  was observed.  As shown in Columns  (1) - (3), the decentral-
ization  coefficients are consistently  negative and  significantly  different from
zero at the 5 percent  level of confidence. The magnitude  of the negative effect
of decentralization  on growth,  however, changes across different samples:  in
the sample covering the entire reform period,  the negative effect of decentral-
ization  on growth appears  weaker than  in the base case, while in the sample
of extensive  decentralization,  the negative effect becomes stronger.
Second, structural  changes are also introduced  by testing  the  growth ef-
fect  of four  other  indicators  of decentralization.  Instead  of measuring  de-
centralization  only  with  budgetary  spending,  we select  DCcse 2,  measuring
decentralization  with  per-capita  total  (budgetary  and  extra-budgetary)  gov-
ernment  spending,  to conduct our estimation.  The result is shown in Column
(5).  Following international  conventions,  we also  choose DCcsei, the  ratio
20of total  provincial  spending  to  total  central  spending,  as  the  decentraliza-
tion  measure  and  the  result  is  shown in  Column  (1).  We further  test  the
growth  effect of decentralization  by dividing  total  spending  into  budgetary
and extra-budgetary  spending.  Column (6) shows the results  with decentral-
ization  measures in both  budgetary  and  extra-budgetary  spending.  Column
(7) contains the results for the same regression when budgetary  spending  and
extra-budgetary  spending  are adjusted  by provincial population  and  income
size, respectively.  The negative and significant effect of fiscal decentralization
on growth  is observed  across all these  different  decentralization  indicators.
If the  ratio  of total  provincial  spending  to  total  central  spending  rises by
I  percent,  provincial  economic growth  will fall by  3.12 percent;  if the  ra-
tio of provincial  budgetary  spending  to central  budgetary  spending  rises by
1 percent,  the  provincial  growth  rate  will be  lowered by  2.15 percent;  for
extra-budgetary  spending,  a rise in the relative provincial share by 1 percent
will reduce the growth  rate  by 0.96 percent.
To introduce  the second structural  change with  respect to  the base case,
we estimate  the base equation  and the augmented  base equation  ( including
all the M- and N-variables) with average provincial data  over the period 1986-
1992. Estimation  of the  base equation  based  on provincial average values is
shown in Column (8): the growth impact  of decentralization  is still negative,
but  not significant.  Estimation  of the augmented base equation  is reported  in
Column  (9), labeled as the non-base  equation,  which presents  a negative and
significant coefficient for fiscal decentralization.  In this  column, we also note
that  the inflation rate  has a positive and nonsignificant effect on growth,  the
effect of provincial openness is positive and statistically  very significant, and
21the rate of investment has the conventional sign (positive),  and is significant.
4.2.3  Alternative  specifications  and  their  sensitivities
Following the results  of negative and  significant signs of coefficients on vari-
ous indicators  of fiscal decentralization,  we now further  pursue the robustness
of the  results.  To do so, sensitivity  analyses are conducted  with  respect  to
each selection of four additional  decentralization  indicators  introduced  ear-
lier.  The robustness is then further examined with random-effect estimations,
as shown in Table 5.
Similar  to Table  3, sensitivity  tests  are conducted  against  all the  decen-
tralization  indicators  where the  M-variables are  labor  (L)  and  the  tax  rate
(T)  and the  N-variables include openness  (F), inflation  (R), and  investment
(I). Eight regressions are estimated  along with different selections of the three
N-variables.  The results  are quite  robust:  the negative  association  between
decentralization  and growth prevails among the 32 estimations,  although  the
result  of negative  significance for DCb 62 appears  relatively  weak in two esti-
mations  at the 5 percent  significance level.  Moreover, the coefficients on the
measure  of openness  and on the  investment  rate  are positive  and  significant
in most  of those  estimations,  some of which are included  in Table 6.
Table 7 shows the results  of random-effect estimates  with the generalized
least  square  (GLS)  regression,  which follows the  specification  used  in  the
base case.  Negative and  significant coefficients on fiscal decentralization  are
found for three  indicators  as shown in Column  (1) - (3).  Column (4) gives a
negative sign for DCcbe 2 ,  but it is not significant. The coefficient for DCbe 2, the
22indicator  with  respect to budgetary  funds adjusted  by provincial population,
turns  out to be positive but  insignificant, as shown in Column (5). However,
overall results from the random-effect estimations  show their consistency with
those  in our previous  (fixed-effect) estimations.
5  Conclusions
The  negative  effect of fiscal decentralization  on provincial economic growth
has  been  found  to  be  consistently  significant and  robust  in China.  It  sug-
gests that  fiscal reforms began in  China since the early  1980s seem to  have
failed to promote  the  country's  economic growth.  This  finding is surprising
in light of the conventional wisdom that  fiscal decentralization  usually makes
a  positive  contribution  to  provincial or local  economic growth.  The  result
seems to suggest that  provincial spending has failed to deliver fast economic
growth  as widely expected.  Perhaps  this  is understandable  because,  in  the
current  stage of the  Chinese economic development,  the central  government
is constantly  constrained  by the  limited  resources for public  investment  in
national  priorities  and  nation-wide  externalities  such as highways, railways,
power  stations,  telecommunications,  and  energy.  These key  projects  may
have far more significant impact on growth across provinces than  their  coun-
terparts  in each province.
This  finding  also has  some implications  for those  developing  countries
and  transitional  economies pursuing  fiscal decentralization.  The  merits  of
fiscal decentralization  have to be  measured  relative  to existing  revenue  and
expenditure  assignments  and  to the  stage of economic development.  In  the
23early  stage  of  economic  development,  the  central  government  may  be  in  a
much  better  position  to  undertake  public  investment  with  nation-wide  exter-
nalities.  More  importantly,  if local  shares  in total  fiscal  revenue  and  expendi-
ture  are  already  high,  further  decentralization  may  result  in slower  economic
growth.  In  this  connection,  the  dangers  of decentralization  put  forward  by
Prud'homme  (1995)  seem  to  be empirically  relevant.
Our  empirical  assessment  of China  is still  quite  preliminary.  For  future
research,  we  need  to  consider  the  composition  of central  and  local  govern-
ment  spending  and  identify  the  contribution  of public  spending  to  provincial
growth  by  both  functional  forms  and  levels  of government  when  the  data  be-
come  available.  Furthermore,  the  role  of intergovernmental  transfers  should
be  considered  explicitly  in  the  process  of fiscal  decentralization.  While  some
analytical  work  has  been  done  in this  respect  (Zou  1994,  1995), the  collection
of  provincial  data  on  both  conditional  and  non-conditional  grants  from  the
center  to  localities  in China  should  be  a  priority.  Finally,  instead  of measur-
ing distortions  by  a  simple  output  tax,  we should  pay  more  attention  to  the
revenue  side  of fiscal  decentralization  and  quantify  the  impacts  of local  taxes
and  central  taxes  on  economic  growth.
24Data  Appendix
Our  empirical  estimations  are  based  on  annual  data  for  28 provinces.
Data sources are all official publications  in China.  Although over 100 volumes
of statistical  publications  are  involved,  major  data  sources  include  China
Statistical  Yearbook  and provincial statistical  yearbooks  for various years."1
Variables used for estimations  are listed below with their data  sources. Names
of provincial areas included  in our estimations  are also listed.
Y  =  real  growth  rate  of provincial  income, measured  by the  percentage
rate
Derived from index of provincial income measured  at constant  price level
(Sources:  for 1980-1985: China National Income Statistics  1949-1985 (Guomin
Shouru  Tongji  Ziliao Huibian  1949-1985); for  1985-1992: China  Statistical
Yearbook  (Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian),  various issues
L=  growth rate  of the provincial labor force, measured  by the percentage
change in the total  number  of the labor force
Derived  from  the  total  number  of the  labor  force in the  whole  society
(Sources:  for 1980-1985, various volumes of provincial statistical  yearbooks;
for 1986-1992: China  Statistical  Yearbook  (Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian),  var-
ious issues
I  = provincial investment  rate,  measured  by the rate  of accumulation  in
fixed asset  and  circulating  funds
"Provincial  statistical yearbooks cover 28 provinces  for various years up to 1994.
25Derived  from  index  of  total  accumulations  in  provincial  income  mea-
sured at constant  price level (Sources: for 1980-1985: China National  Income
Statistics  1949-1985 (Guomin  Shouru  Tongji Ziliao Huibian 1949-1985); for
1985-1992: China  Statistical  Yearbook  (Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian),  various
issues)
F  =  degree of openness of provincial economy, measured by the share  of
total  volume of foreign trade  (exports  and  imports)  in provincial income
Derived from the total  volume of provincial exports  and imports  (divided
by provincial  income)  (Sources:  Almanac  of China's  Foreign Economic Re-
lations  and  Trade  (Zhongguo Duiwai  Jingji  Maoyi Nianjian),  various issues
in  1984-1994/95.)
T  =  degree of distortion  in provincial economy, measured  by the ratio  of
provincial revenue collection in provincial income
Derived from provincial budgetary  revenue collection (divided by provin-
cial income)  (Sources:  various volumes of provincial statistical  yearbooks)
R = inflation rate,  measured by the overall social retail price index in each
province  (Sources:  China  Statistical  Yearbook  (Zhongguo  Tongji Nianjian),
various issues)
DCcsel =  decentralization  measured by the ratio of total  provincial spend-
ing to total  central  spending
Total  (central or provincial ) spending  is the sum of budgetary  spending
and  extra-budgetary  spending  (Sources:  see sources of budgetary  spending
and  of extra-budgetary  spending)
DCrse2  =  decentralization  measured  by the ratio  of per-capita  provincial
spending  to per-capita  central spending
26Per-capita  (central  or provincial)  spending  is derived from  spending  di-
vided  by population.  (Sources:  for provincial  population:  various volumes
of provincial  statistical  yearbooks; for the central government,  national  pop-
ulation  is  used,  China  Statistical  Yearbook  (Zhongguo  Tongji  Nianjian),
various  issues)
DCbeI  = decentralization  measured  by the ratio  of provincial  budgetary
spending  to  central  budgetary  spending  (Sources: for province:  various  vol-
umes  of provincial  statistical  yearbooks;  for the  central  government:  China
Statistical  Yearbook  (Zhongguo  Tongji Nianjian),  various issues)
DCbe2  =  decentralization  measured  by the  ratio  of per-capita  provincial
budgetary  spending  to  per-capita  central  budgetary  spending  (Sources: see
sources of budgetary  spending  and of population)
DCebel=  decentralization  measured by the ratio of provincial extra-budgetary
spending  to  central  extra-budgetary  spending  (Sources: China  Government
Finance Statistics  (Zhongguo Caizheng Tongji, 1950-1991), Yearbook of China
Government  Finance  (Zhongguo Caizheng Nianjian,  1993)
DCebe2 =  decentralization  measured  by  the  ratio  of  [provincial extra-
budgetary  spending/provincial  income] to  [central extra-budgetary  spend-
ing/national  income] (Sources: see sources of provincial income and of extra-
budgetary  spending)
List of provincial areas:
Beijing,  Tianjin,  Hebei, Shanxi,  Neimenggu (Inner  Mongolia), Liaoning,
Jilin,  Heilongjiang,  Shanghai,  Jiangsu,  Zhejiang,  Anhui,  Fujian,  Jiangxi,
Shandong,  Henan,  Hubei, Hunan,  Guangdong, Guangzi, Sichuan,  Guizhou,
Yunnan,  Shaanxi,  Gansu,  Qinghai, Ningzia,  and  Xinjiang.
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32Table 1:  Size of Provincial Budget and Income
Size of Budgetary  Spending  I[  Per capita Income
Provincial Areas  Average (1980-1992)  Initial Level (1980)  Current Level (1992)  Average (1980-1992)  Initial Level (1980)  Current Level (1992)
Three  Metropolitan  Cities  14.57%  12.01%  1515%  2823%  16.51%  42.16%
Beijing  17.06%  13.47%  16.72%  24 67%  12.46%  39.12%
rianjin  17.09%  15.76%  18 37%  21 89%  12.43%  33.23%
Shanghai  10.23%  6.79%  12.35%  38.14%  24.83%  54.14%
Costal Areas  11.71%  1317%  11.67%  10.60%  3.82%  18 32%
Jiangsu  8.96%  10.69%  8.72%  1170%  4.56%  18 53%
Zhejiang  10.84%  1095%  9.84%  11.72%  414%  20.09%
Fujian  17.25%  20.65%  16.99%  8.49%  2.89%  1513%
Shandong  10.24%  11.93%  9.60%  930%  3.46%  16.13%
Guangdong  13.37%  1162%  13.22%  13.09%  4.03%  21.74%
Inland Areas  15.04%  16.47%  15.66%  7.98%  3.72%  12.54%
Hebei  13.01%  12.67%  1150%  7.85%  364%  12 74%
Shanxi  20.34%  2309%  18.17%  738%  3.43%  11.35%
Liaoning  13.76%  13.66%  17.42%  1429%  7.16%  2208%
Jilin  20.18%  20.38%  22.14%  9.34%  3.85%  14 53%
Heilongjiang  15.93%  13.74%  17 82%  1110%  585%  17.59%
Anhui  12.59%  1303%  1575%  626%  2.61%  8.82%
Jiangxi  15.93%  16.18%  1545%  620%  303%  1011%
Henan  13.71%  16 42%  10 93%  5 95%  2 66%  9 54%
Hubei  13.45%  15 26%  14.09%  8 48%  3.71%  12 97%
Hunan  14.25%  17 88%  12.36%  6.69%  316%  10 56%
Sichuan  13.55%  12.63%  15 28%  600%  2.70%  9.78%
Shannxi  19.51%  22.74%  18.96%  6.20%  2.84%  10.38%
Minority Areas  26.13%  28.16%  24.58%  6.52%  287%  1095%
Neimeng  29.65%  34.83%  25 30%  7 20%  2.81%  12 06%
Guangxi  13.93%  15.01%  14 70%  5 33%  2.32%  8 86%
Guizhou  14.52%  12.81%  19.05%  4.51%  1.90%  7 36%
Yuannan  25.92%  23.12%  29.03%  5.70%  2 38%  10 09%
Gansu  22.70%  20.27%  22 72%  6 25%  316%  10 00%
Oinghai  40.46%  42.28%  3448%  7.41%  389%  11.63%
Ningxia  40.52%  48.80%  30.58%  6.77%  3.15%  11  07%
Xinpang  25.74%  31.33%  20.81%  8 96%  3.59%  16 52%
Minimum  8.96%  6.79%  8.72%  4.51%  1.90%  7.36%
Maxmum  40.52%  48.80%  34 48%  38.14%  24.83%  54 14%
Standard Deviation  0.08  0.09  0.06  007  0.04  010
Note:  (1)  Measured by the ratio of provincial budgetray spending to provincial income
(2) Intial  year  forXinjiang  is 1985
Sources:  See Data Appendix
33Table 2 (a)  Descriptive Statistics of Provincial Decentralization in Budgetary Finance (1)
Provincial  Areas  Average  Minimum  Maximum  Standard  Deviation  Initial  Level  Current  Level  Growth  Rate
|  _____________________________  (1978-1992)  (1978-1992)  (1978.1992)  (1978.1992)  (1978)  (1992)  (19781992)
Three Metropolitan Cities  3  94%  2.50%  5.19%  0.0078  3 90%  3.80%  -2.57%
Beijing  3.93%  2.29%  538%  0.0095  3.91%  3.83%  -201%
Tianjin  3.01%  2.25%  3.72%  0.0045  2.79%  2.49%  -10  89%
Shanghai  4.86%  2 95%  6 63%  0 0116  4 99%  5.07%  1.64%
Costal  Areas  6.21%  3.76%  896%  0.0162  5.29%  7.30%  57.15%
Jiangsu  6.05%  3.95%  8.13%  0.0127  5.45%  6.72%  23.43%
Liaoning  7.16%  4.43%  10.34%  00186  6.01%  7.93%  3204%
Zhejiang  4.53%  2.66%  6.77%  0.0124  3.35%  5.09%  52.19%
Fujian M  3.79%  2.31%  5 47%  0.0106  2.31%  4.51%  95.17%
Shandong  6.83%  4.24%  10.29%  0.0183  612%  7.78%  27.10%
Guangdong  8.91%  4.16%  12.77%  0.0292  5.51%  11.73%  11297%
Inland  Areas  4.96%  3.62%  8.50%  0.0092  4.91%  4.91%  2.06%
Hebei  5.60%  3.67%  6.99%  0.0088  6.23%  - 5.41%  -13.18%
Shanixi  3.87%  290%  4.60%  0.0046  4.05%  3.43%  -1525%
Jilin  4.19%  2.64%  6.07%  00119  3.14%  4.27%  3621%
Heilongjiang  5.80%  3.98%  7.72%  0.0112  8.05%  5.47%  -s.59%
Anhui  3.90%  2.58%  5.26%  0.0082  3.48%  396%  13.73%
Jiangai  3.36%  2.33%  4.41%  0.0062  3.12%  3.s5%  18.98%
Henan  5.95%  4.90%  7.33%  0.0058  6.47%  5.56%  -14 16%
Hubei  541%  3.92%  7.15%  0.01  5.75%  5.29%  -8.12%
Hunan  5  09%  4.45%  8.23%  0.0044  5.37%  4.96%  -7.71%
Sichuan  7.92%  4.96%  11.51%  0.0211  6.86%  8.54%  24.55%
Shaanxi  3.48%  2.72%  41.0%  0.0053  3.52%  3.49%  -085%
MinorityAreas  2.77%  1.72%  3.87%  0.006  2.32%  2.98%  20.72%
Innr  Mongolia  4.02%  2.72%  5.08%  0.0o67  3.59%  385%  7.33%
Guangoi  2.73%  1.82%  3.75%  0.0088  2.75%  3.27%  18.91%
Guizhou  1.92%  1.03%  3.01%  0.0086  1.20%  2.53%  110.35%
Yunnan  4.89%  2.81%  7.41%  0.016  3.51%  6.50%  85.08%
Gansu  2.84%  1.88%  3.73%  o.o055  2.75%  2.86%  3.77%
ONhai  1.18%  0.90%  1.42%  0.0015  1.31%  0.99%  -23.80%
Ngna  1.08%  0.77%  1.28%  0.0015  1.11%  0.85%  -23.55%
Xinjang  (2)  3.47%  3.00%  3.80%  0.0024  3 42%  3.00%  -12.36%
Minimum  1  06%  0.0015  1.11%  0.85%  -23.80%
Mawimum  8.91%  0.0292  8.86%  11.73%  112.97%
Standard  Deviation  0.0181  0.0162  0.0224  0.1950
Note: (1) Fiscal Decnalizaton  is measured by t  ratio  princda  budgetay spendibg cental  budgetray  spending
(2) Iniial yea are 190  and 1985 fo  Fujian and for Xiny  respectey.
Source:  see  DC  AppendTable 2 (b)  Descriptive Statistics of Provincial Decentralization in Consolidated Finance (1)
Provincial Areas  Average  Minimum  Maximum  Standard  Deviation  Initial  Level  Current  Level  Growth  Rate
(1986-1992)  (1986-1992)  (1986-1992)  (19B661992)  (196)  (1992)  (1966-1992)
Three Metropolitan Cities  563%  4.27%  6.23%  0.0082  5.92%  4.27%  -27.78%
Betang  5 81%  5.13%  6.22%  0 0035  5.87%  5.13%  .9.56%
rin  3.56%  269M  4.18%  0.0048  4.18%  2.09%  .35.71%
Shanghai  7.54%  5.00%  8.63%  0.0112  7.90%  5.00%  -36.s7%
Costal  Areas  7.92%  7.02%  88.9%  0.0057  7.02%  7.43%  5.82%
Jienpu  8.45%  7.90%  9.35%  0.0048  8.06%  7.90%  -1.91%
Lsa nmg  10.28%  856%  11.59%  0.0109  9.00%  8.56%  -4.93%
Zhua  8.11%  5.45%  8.82%  00D47  5.45%  5.89%  8.12%
Ft#on  418%  3.55%  4.77%  0.0044  3.55%  4.0s%  15.10%
Sh  -aon  8863%  7.41%  10.12%  0o.09  7.41%  7.8%  6.12%
Guadong  9s91%  &8%  1087%  0.0o  86.6%  1028%  18.71%
Irland Areas  5.49%  4.78%  6.09%6  0.0043  5.37%  4.78%  .10.ss%
Heb~  6.35%  5.s3%  7.23%  0.0058  5.85%  5.75%  -1.85%
Shad  4.16%  3.54%  4.63%  0.0032  4.20%  3.54%  .17.28%
Ain  5.27%  4.30%  580%  0.0047  5.26%  4.30%  -18.21%
Hh  N9  8.30%  5.15%  8.96%  0.0052  6.52%  5.15%  -20.99%
A9di  4.40%  s87%  4.72%  0.0026  4.52%  3.87%  .14.42%
tJI  J  g  36%  l39%  .95%  0.0017  3.59%  3.39%  -5.73%
Huian  5.75%  5.26%  6.36%  0.0037  5.26%  5.29%  0.18%
Fl  5.91%  4.s9  1.47%  0.0044  5.95%  4.99%  .16.13%
aFo-  5.39%  4.89%  5.91%  0.0029  5.16%  4.9%  .5.62%
Si".  9.48%  6.17%  10.79%  0.0079  9.16%  &17%  .10.82%
a  369%  3.S1%  4.15%  0.0027  3.45%  331%  -4.19%
Miwrt  Ares  2.79s  25ss%  3065%  0S0  2.61%  2.61%  -0.07
h.p  &.ola  4.00%  3.51%  4.36%  o0025  4.01%  351%  .12.53%
Guine  3.50%  2Z02%  3S.%  oCoSS  292%  3.72%  2.30%
Gouahou  2.14%  1.61%  2ss%  0Q002  1.81%  2.06%  1527%
YU,  s5.19%  4.34%  6.9%  0.0056  4.34%  5.16%  1&04%
G  . w  2.80%  243%  .03%  0O.18  2.84%  2.43%  .14.32%
af% w  1.02%  0.61%  1.12%  0.001  1.07%  0.81%  -24.22%
Nb,da  0.91%  0.72%  0.99%  00o0  0.99%  0.72%  -27.93s
Xk;eg  2.74%  2.42%  289%  0.0015  269%  2.42%  -16.13%
M  inum  0.91%  0.000D9  0.Q9C  0.72%  -36.67%
MmndmLun  10.26%  0.0112  9.16%  10.26%  27.30%
Standard Devtiaon  0.0242  0.021  0.022S  0.1554
Note: (1) Fa  Oen-  Iaon  is n,umed  bhy  tm fto  d piw*aM crmaids  sd  spending  b c  C011c10d  een  rs
Source:  see  Dab  Appenwdrable 2 (c)  Descriptive Statistics of Provincial Decentralization in Consolidated Finance (1)
Provincial Areas  Average  Minimum  Maximum  Standard  Deviation  Initial  Level  Current  Level  Growth  Rate
(198-1992)  (1980-1992)  (1980-1992)  (1960.1992)  (1980  (1992)  (1980-1992)
Three  Metropoltan  Cites  420.83%  28.52%  .549.88%  0839  268.52%  407.41%  51.73%
Beillg  438.18%  254.e9%  594.24%  1.088  254.80%  429.79%  55.75%
rtrion  3s8.84%  297.11%  487.71%  0.t05  297.11%  331.31%  11.51%
Shanghai  427.4u%  253.76%  555.68%  1.094  253.70%  48115%  81.73%
Costal  Areas  140.43%  82.98%  202.70%  0.3614  85.87%  163.25%  90.12%
Jianpu  103.64%  e5.7%  140.22%  0.232  73.95%  11399%  54.14%
U  oning  209.58%  115.52%  - 300.72%  0.5741  146.34%  234.s5%  58.32%
Zhejian  12.85%  86.74%  181.10%  0.3479  e8.74%  130.20%  102.51%
Fujian  14U.95%  9068%  213.47%  0.4029  90.e8%  172.41%  90.21%
Shianrdng  94.20%  57.38%  141WG%  0.2611  62.52%  106.29%  70.eo%
Guangdong  115.54%  70.90%  238.92%  0.5309  70.9s%  212.69%  199.72%
Inland  Areas  120.01%  85.s8%  158.09%  0.244e  s6.8s%  118.42%  37.91%
Hebei  108.03%  70.04%  134.04%  0.169  70.04%  100.94%  44.11%
Shanxi  152.55%  115.69%  181.77%  0.1854  12D.11%  135.07%  12.45%
Jilin  198.27%  118.21%  285.83%  0.58  11884%  202.46%  70.36%
Heilongliang  18e.17%  121.96%  252.87%  0.4117  121.96%  181.88%  49.13%
Anhw  80.21%  51.65%  105.96%  0.1752  51.18%  79.75%  54.38%
Jiangxi  101.78%  70.56%  132.63%  0.1891  74.18%  109.39%  47.50%
Henan  79.10%  Ws.34%  97.24%  0.074  s8.34%  73.49%  10.78%
Hubei  114.99%  82.73%  154.35%  0.2279  85.91%  112.38%  30.79%
Hunan  95.15%  8.45%  116.77%  0.0844  85.77%  93.55%  9.08%
Sichuan  83.49%  50.02%  121.21%  0.2388  51.76%  91.44%  76.84%
Shaanxi  122.32%  95.07%  161.95%  0.196  97.95%  122.30%  24.88%
Minority  Areas  187.39%  122.27%  233.73%  0.3275  126.92  178.02%  3s.e8%
Inner  Mongolia  213.61%  142.79%  268.19%  0.3697  148.51%  204.45%  37.67%
Guangxi  74.44%  50.O0%  101  .7%  0.1721  52.73%  87.88%  e6.65%
Guizhou  70.57%  38.84%  106.99%  0.2312  36.84%  90.05%  144.45%
Yunnan  154.04%  81.13%  228.91%  0.4931  8Z79%  196.84%  139.92
Gansu  147.20%  95.83%  193.83%  0.29se  97.29%  146.30%  50.37%
Qinghai  300.67%  236.81%  32s94%  a3698  23.81%  252.81%  6.75%
Ningia  271.91%  199.84%  316.50%  0.3895  233.49%  205.90%  -11.82%
xin  %.ng  (  266.71%  222.13%  294.64%  0.212  265.91%  222.13%  -16.46%
Minimum  70.57%  0.074  36.84%  73.49%  *1e.4%
Maximum  438.18%  1.094  297.11%  481.15%  199.72%
Standard  Deviation  1.1281  0.7277  0.9279  0.4613
Note:  (1) Fiscal  Dcentralz  ation is measured  by the rabo  of per capita paAncial  budgetary  spending  t  per capita central budgtary spending
(2) Initial year for Xinjiang Is 1985
Source: se  De"  At  wTable 3: -SENSITIVITY RESULTS  FOR  BASIC VARIABLES:  Base Case
Variable: Real Growth  Rate Co,  181  - 1992
Variafe  Coefficient  Standard  Error  t  R-Sqtr  AdW;d  R-Sqmu  S.E. Of  Regrson  ther Variables
L (Labor)  high  0.44  0.312  1.41  0.373  0.247  0.043  I, R
base  0.274  0.312  0.878  0.328  0.203  0.044
ks  0.143  0.307  0.466  0.367  0.244  0.043  F
T (Tax Re)  high  -0.115  0.154  -0.749  0.444  0.32  0.041  I. R, F
base  -0.4069  0.155  -2.628  0.328  0.203  0.044
low  -0.4069  0.155  -2.628  0.328  0.203  0.044
DCbS2  high  -0.047  0.0139  -3.413  0.367  0.244  0.043  F
base  -0.05  0.014  -3.541  0.328  0.203  0.044
_________________  k  -0.069  0.014  -4.821  0.444  0.328  0.041  I, R. F
Notes:  1.  Al esavna  honav  conC red  pmWciai  Abed  ofc*s  but  Uio  risai  ae not mppde  hew.
2.  NuiberofobewvaJs  196.
3.  DCbe2=  decetdkalon measured  by  te rabo  of  per-cph p'r**wd budgutw  *  e  to  per-capb  VW"b uAdaty  tpene.
Souas:  See  Ws deb  awxk.
wJTable 4: -Estimates  of Structural Changes
Dependent  Variable:  Real  Growth Rate
Variable  (1  )=Base  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)= Base,  averap  (9)z Non-base,  a8erage
(19661S2  (I1992)  (19651961  (196192)  (19661992)  (19619W2)  (198tl19-2  (1986199  (1961-W2
Corndt  0.104  0.01
(4.13)  0.1945
L  (Labor)  0.27  0.06  0.003  0.23  0.31  0.22  0.27  .0.23  053
p77)  p.191)  (0009  pD79)  (0991  ID.77)  P0.4  (-.40A  (1.30
T (Tax  Rab)  4.41  .021  -0.18  4.36  .31  0.36  4.35  .006  -004







DCbe2  .05  -.01  -.09  40.02  4.003  4.02
(-3.54)  (437)  (4.4A  (-.6)  (-.51  (2.85)
DCebe2  .0.10
(-4.25)
R  (Infbtion  Rate)  0°S4.
(0.324)
F (Openness)  1525
(5.21)
I (Investrent)  0.14
____________________________  (~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~2.33)
Number  of Obervdions  e19  308  137  196  196  196  196  26  28
R-Square  0o328  0.134  0.344  0.068  0.62
Adjusted R-Square  0202  004  0.156  0.257  0.175  0.254  0.279  -0.051  0.512
S.E.  Refession  0.04  009  004  0.0428  0.0451  042  0.0421  0.022  0.015
Notes:
1.  Estmnaton  equations  (1)  -(7)  have  considered  pmvincdal  Axed  efflcts,  but  the  resu*s  are  not  reported  her.
2.  Vahues  of  t-stadtiscs  appear  in  pamntheses.
3.  DCcse  1=  decentrakation  measured  by  the  ratio  of  total  provincial  spendng  to  total  central  spending.
4.  DCcse2=  decentrazabon  measured  by  the  ratio  of per-capita  proincdal  spendng  to  per-capNta  contra  spendhg.
5.  DCbM  = decentralzation  measured  by  the  ratio  of  promndal  budgetary  spendng  to  central  budgetary  spendng.
6.  DCebet=  decentralization  measured  by  the  ra6io  otprowindal  extra-budgetary  spendng  to  cenfra  exta-budgetary  spendog
7 DCbe2=  decentiraztion  measured  by  the  ra6o  of  per-capita  pmrvndal  budgetary  spendng  to  per-capite  central  budgetary  spendig
8 DCebe2=  decentrazation  measured  by  the  raio  of  [provinh l exina-budgetary  spending#omidalhwome  to  [centa oexra-budgetary  spendhat  nalh  come).
Sources:Tabe 6:  -SENSITIVITY RESULTS  FOR  FISCAL  DECENTRALIZATION  INDICATORS
Variabe:  Real  Growth  Rate  m. 198 - 1m
Variable  Coemci  i  Standard  Effor  I  R  wa  A4doid  R rquwe  S.E.  Rei  onm  OiwiorVi
L (Labor)  high  0 409  0 29  0137  0 415  0.299  0.041  .R
base  0235  0o299  076  0373  0257  0043
blw  0112  0.26  0369  0.425  0.31i  0.041  F
T(Tax  Rate)  high  -0051  0.142  -0361  0.513  0.411  0.0Q8  l,R,F
bow  -0  3S1  0.14  -0.2579  0.373  0.257  0.043
ow  -00361  0146  -02579  0.373  0.257  0.043
DCcsl  hih  3.124  0.605  s.163  0.373  0.267  0.043
be  -3124  o.e05  4.163  0.373  0.257  0.043
b.v  -4039  0  569  4657  0.464  0.361  O.9  R,  F
L (Labt)  high  Q4s  0.31S  1342  0.51  022  0O0436  R
base  O.314  0.317  0.989  0304  0175  0.0451
km  0.106  0.313  0.e  0.33  0Q211  0.0441  F
T (Tax  Rate)  high  - O6  012  -0473  0Q364  0.230  0.043  R, F
be"  .0313  0.176  .1759  0.304  0.175  0.0451
iw4  S  0313  0.176  -1.759  0304  0.175  0.0451
DCc*.2  high  o.304  0.142  -2.134  0.33s  0.211  0.0441  F
base  -0.372  0.144  -2.50  0.304  0.175  0.0451
l  -0S51  0.15  4.371  0.351  0.22  0.0436  1 R
L (Labor)  high  0.404  0.3  1.347  0.418  0.20a  0.0415  1, R
bsa  0.216  0.3  0727  0.375  0.254  0.0427
low  0.061  0.29  0.261  0.434  0321  0.040  F T  (Ta Rle)  hih  o.026  0.142  -0190  0.531  0.429  0.0374  l, F
bao  -. 0377  0.1514  -2.466  0.375  0.254  0.0427
kaw  -0377  0.1514  -24a6  0.375  0254  0.0427
DCbe1  high  .21i3  0.564  4791  0406  0.2  0.0417  1
be  -2147  0.576  4.715  0.375  0.254  0.0427
low  .3.42  0.56e  -6.99  0.507  0.403  0.0382  R.  F
DCabel  hi9h  40.775  0.463  -1604  05057  0Q403  0.02  R.  F
ba  -0.96  0 539  -1.7a  0.375  0.254  0.0427
ki  -1.065  0.527  -2022  0.406  0Q2  0.0417  1
L (Labor)  hih  0.402  0.303  0.133  041  0291  0.0418  R
be"  0 265  0.297  0.694  0.3  0.279  0.042
m  014S  0.202  049  04  0.313  0.041  F
T (Ta  Rae)  high  -0.0724  0.145  -0406  0Q507  0.4  0.0365  , R.  F
baef  -0.347  0.146  -2346  0.36  0.279  0.042
low  -0347  0145  -2.346  0.396  0.279  0.0422
DCbe2  high  40021  0015  *145  0429  0313  0.041  F
bas  -0023  0.015  -1.516  0396  0.279  0.0422
l  0.0419  0.014a  -2.36  0.507  0.4  0.03  i, R.  F
DCebe2  high  -0t09  00211  -4206  0.47  0.3a  0.03o7  R,F
bae  -0005  0.0224  -425  0.396  0.279  0.0422
kw  -9  0.0217  4525  0.439  0.326  0.0406 
Akfbs  Formcpbnoms of vwmbbds  mid  dab bouafs.am  Teh  2Table 6: -Estimates with Openess  and investment
Dependent Variable:  Real Growth Rate
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
(1986-1992)  (198-1992)  (19-1992)  (1986-199)
L (Labor)  0.39  0.39  0.37  0.38
(1.41)  (1.28)  (1.38)  (1.35)
T (Tax Rate)  -0.05  -003  -0.03  -0.07













R (Inflation Rate)  0.18  0.11  0.21  0.15
(3.59)  (2.04)  (4.19)  (2.98)
F  (Openness)  0.29  0.23  0.32  0.24
(5.62)  (3.79)  (8.14)  (4.45)
I (Investment)  0.16  0.20  0.15  0.18
(3.06)  (3.30)  (2.8M  (3.41)
Number of Obervations  198  196  198  198
Adjusted  R-Square  0.411  0.281  0.429  0.400
S.E.  Regression  0.038  0.042  0.037  0.038
Notes:
1. Values  oft-statistics appear in parentheses.
2.  DCcsel=  decentralization  measured  by  the  ratio  of  total  pro  vncmiaspendNng  to  total  centralsp.nding.
3.  DCcse2=  decentralization  measured  by  the  ratio  of per-capita  provincial  spending  to  per-capita  central  spencding
4.  DCbel=  decentralization  mneasuredby  the  ratdo  of  proncim  calbudgetary  spending  to  central  budgetary  spending.
5.  DCebe  1  = decentralization  measured  by  the  ratio  of  provincial  extra-budgetary  spending  to  central  extra-budgeter
6.  DCbe2=  decentralization  measured  by  the  ratio  of  per-capita  provnctal  budgetary  spending  to  per-capita  central
9.  DCebe2=  decentralization  measured  by  the  ratio  of  [  provincial  extra-budgetary  spendin  gprovincial  income)  to
(central  extra-budgetary  spending/national  income].
Sources:
See  the  Data  Appendix.
40Table 7: -Estimates with Random  Effects  (GLS)
Dependent  Variable:  Real  Growth Rate
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
_______________________  (19W1992)  (198-1962)  (1988-1962)  (1986-1992)  (1986-1992)
Constant  o.168  0.229  0.233  0144
(8.09)  (6.769)  (6.885)  (8 057)
L (Labor)  0.17  0.20  018  0.22  0.20
(0.581)  (0.885)  (0.8349)  (0.725)  (705)
T (Tax Rate)  -0.38  -0.41  -0.43  -0 36  -0  32












DCebe2  (-4  40)
Number of Obervations  196  19s  196  198  196
S.E. Regression  0.043  0.041  0.043  0.041  0041
Notes:
1.  Values  of t-statstcs  appear  in parentheses.
2.  DCcset= decentralIzatIon  measured  by the  raeo  of  total  provindal  spend/ng  to  total  central  spending.
3.  DCcse2=  decentralization  measured  by the  rato of per-capita  proWincial  spending  to  per-capita  central  spending.
4. DCbel= decentralzaton  measured  by the  rato of  provincial  budgetaly  spending  to central  budgetary  spending.
5. DCebe  1  = decentralizaton  measured  by  the  rato of provincial  extra-budgetary  spending  to central  extra-budgetary  spending.
6. DCbe2=  decentralizaton  measured  by the  rato of  per-capita  provincial  budgetary  spending  to  per-capita  central  budgetary  spending.
9. DCebe2=  decentralization  measured  by  the  reao of [provincial  extra-budgetary  spending/provincial  income]  to
[central  extra-budgetary  spending/national  income).
Sources:
See  the  Data  Appendix.
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